

Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 ACDA-07 IO-13 /089 W

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P 211000Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0982

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI PRIORITY

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY

USLO PEKING PRIORITY

CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 10983

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, CH, UR, US

SUBJ: REASONS BEHIND MIYAZAWA STATEMENTS ON CHINA POLICY

SUMMARY: LAST WEEK FONMIN MIYAZAWA PUBLICLY WARNED US AGAINST SUD-
DEN MOVES TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH PRC, TOLD DIET THAT CHINESE
SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE POSITION NORTHERN TERRITORIES WAS HARMFUL,
AND ADMITTED JAPANESE CAUTION TOWARD PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY
WITH PEKING BASED IN PART ON CONCERN OVER SOVIET OPPOSITION. MUL-
LING SPECULATION RIFE IN TOKYO AS TO REASONS BEHIND MIYAZAWA'S RE-
MARKS, WE CONCLUDE THAT FONMIN MOTIVATED BY STRONGLY AND GENUINELY
FELT NEED TO URGE AMERICANS IN GENERAL AND DEMOCRATS IN PARTICULAR
TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION ON TAIWAN QUESTION. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS DE-
LIGHTED BY WHAT HE SAID, DESIRE TO MOVE TOWARD MOSCOW DOES NOT AP-
PEAR PRIMARY REASON. MIYAZAWA PROBABLY RECKONED THAT PROGRESS ON
PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH PEKING UNLIKELY IN SHORT RUN, AT
LEAST DURING HIS TENURE AS FOREIGN MINISTER, AND COSTS TO SINO-
JAPANESE RELATIONS OVER LONG TERM WOULD BE SLIGHT. AGAINST THESE
DEBITS HE PROBABLY ALSO WEIGHED THE CREDITS TO BE GAINED WITHIN CON-
SERVATIVE WING OF LDP, CREDITS THAT MIGHT BE VERY VALUABLE DURING
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PERIOD OF INTRA-PARTY MANUEVERING SURE TO LIE AHEAD. END SUMMARY.

1. AT HIS MEETING WITH SENATOR MANSFIELD JULY 12, FONMIN MIYAZAWA MADE PLAIN HIS SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO IN US-CHINA RELATIONS. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PEKING WITHOUT ASSURANCES FROM THE CHINESE AGAINST USE OF FORCE IN SOLVING TAIWAN QUESTION. RIGHT AFTER MEETING, HE TALKED ABOUT THE CONVERSATION TO THE PRESS, WHICH INTERPRETED HIS REMARKS TO MEAN THAT MIYAZAWA BELIEVES ANY SUDDEN CHANGE IN PROCESS OF US-PRC NORMALIZATION WILL BE DESTABILIZING IN EAST ASIA. EARLIER, ON JULY 9 MIYAZAWA TOLD DIET QUESTIONER THAT CHINESE SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE POSITION ON RETURN OF NORTHERN TERRITORIES WAS NOT HELPFUL, IN FACT WAS SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN JAPAN AND USSR. HE REVEALED THAT JAPANESE HAD EXPLAINED THIS POSITION TO CHINESE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. CALLED UPON SUBSEQUENTLY TO EXPLAIN THIS AND OTHER VIEWS IN THE DIET, MIYAZAWA WENT ON TO SAY THAT JAPANESE CAUTION TOWARD CONCLUDING PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH PRC WAS PREDICATED IN PART UPON CONCERN OVER THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF SUCH A MOVE ON RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION,

2. THESE ALL FAMILIAR PRIVATE JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON RELATIONS WITH THE BIG POWERS, AND COME AS NO SUBSTANTIVE SURPRISE. BUT TO HAVE THEM REVEALED ALL AT ONCE BY A FOREIGN MINISTER FAMOUS FOR CAREFUL CALCULATION, CIRCUMSPECTION, AND CAUTION IN PUBLIC HAS CAUSED A RIOT OF SPECULATION IN TOKYO AS TO THE REASONS BEHIND THE REMARKS.

3. MIYAZAWA WON'T TELL, OF COURSE. WHEN HE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR JULY 15 THAT HE HOPED HIS REMARKS ON US-PRC RELATIONS WOULD CAUSE US NO PROBLEM, AMBASSADOR RETURNED THE HOPE AND SUGGESTED THAT MIYAZAWA MUST HAVE HAD SOME PURPOSE IN MIND. FONMIN SMILED IMPISHLY, AGREED, BUT SAID NOTHING. WELL PLACED AND USUALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE FONOFF OFFICIALS FROM MIYAZAWA'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ON DOWN ARE AS MYSTIFIED AS EVERYONE ELSE. CLAIMS FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS SECRETARIAT THAT FONMIN INTENDED TO SPEAK "OFF THE RECORD" AND WAS BETRAYED BY PRESS WE KNOW TO BE WRONG. IN FACT, MIYAZAWA TOLD JOURNALISTS SUBSEQUENTLY THAT WHEN HE HEARD THRUST OF THEIR QUESTIONS HE REGRETTED HE WAS NOT "OFF THE RECORD."

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4. MIYAZAWA'S WORRY OVER THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN CAN BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE. THE PROSPECT OF THE PRC USING FORCE TO SEIZE TAIWAN IS A GENUINE NIGHTMARE TO JAPANESE PLANNERS, FAR DISTANT BUT STILL POSSIBLE. MIYAZAWA'S PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF POST-MAO POLITICS IN PEKING, AS EXPRESSED TO VISITOR AFTER VISITOR HAS BEEN GLOOMY, PROJECTING A CHAOTIC INTERREGNUM LASTING UNTIL MODERATE ELEMENTS WIN OUT OVER RADICAL OPPONENTS. HE SEES THE US GUARANTEE OF TAIWAN SECURITY AS THE SOLID UNDERPINNING OF THE STATUS QUO IN THE MEANTIME. MIYAZAWA IS NOT OPPOSED TO US-PRC NORMALIZATION OR TO A CHANGE IN THE FORM OF SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR TAIWAN. CONCERN OVER THE TIMING AND MODALITIES IS CRUCIAL HOWEVER AND SHARED BY MANY JAPANESE. THE FONMIN HAS MADE THIS CLEAR TO EVERY AMERICAN HE HAS SEEN SINCE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RICHARDSON CALLED ON HIM IN JUNE.

5. FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS AND THE VARIETY OF ANALYSES PROVIDED HIM, MIYAZAWA APPEARS TO HAVE RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DEMOCRATS MIGHT MOVE FASTER ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE AFTER THE ELECTIONS THAN THE REPUBLICANS AND MIGHT USE THE "JAPANESE MODEL." MIYAZAWA MAY HAVE FOUND THE PRESENCE IN HIS OFFICE OF A LEADING DEMOCRAT ON THE EVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION AN IRRESISTIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIDENTIAL

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PUBLISH HIS STRONG FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT. INCLUDING A BELIEF THAT THE "JAPANESE MODEL" IS INADEQUATE FOR US.

6. MIYAZAWA'S DIET STATEMENTS CRITICIZING CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES AND ADMITTING THAT SOVIET ATTITUDES INSPIRE JAPANESE CAUTION TOWARD CONCLUDING THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH PEKING SUGGEST, AS DOES HIS STATEMENT TO MANSFIELD, THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER SEES LITTLE HOPE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CHINESE, AT LEAST DURING HIS TENURE AS FOREIGN MINISTER. MIYAZAWA TOLD MANSFIELD THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A 50-50 CHANCE OF PROGRESS ON THE PREACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY AFTER HIS

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA LAST FALL. SINCE THEN, CHOU'S DEATH, TENG'S DISMISSAL AND MAO'S RAPID PHYSICAL DETERIORATION HAVE PARALYZED THE CHINESE BODY POLITIC PREVENTING THE FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY FOR MOVEMENT ON THE TREATY. MIYAZAWA PROBABLY CALCULATES THAT DAMAGE HIS STATEMENTS MIGHT DO TO RELATIONS WITH PEKING CAN BE REPAIRED UNDER A NEW FONMIN, AND THAT FUNDAMENTAL SINO-JAPANESE TIES WILL NOT SUFFER IN LONG RUN.

7. SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY DELIGHTED WITH MIYAZAWA'S REMARKS. SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN TOKYO GRIN FROM EAR TO EAR AND DISCUSS SUBJECT WITH GUSTO. HOWEVER, THOUGH JAPANESE WILL DRAW WHATEVER BENEFIT THEY CAN FROM BETTER ATMOSPHERE IN RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW THAT MIGHT RESULT, IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-JAPAN RELATIONS SEEMS MORE A BYPRODUCT OF MIYAZAWA'S STATEMENT THAN A PRINCIPAL MOTIVATION.

8. IN CALCULATING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPACT OF HIS STATEMENTS, MIYAZAWA MUST HAVE CONCLUDED THAT CREDITS FAR OUTWEIGH DEBITS. THOUGH PM MIKI WAS REPORTED ANGERED BY HIS FONMIN'S REMARKS, MAJORITY OF LDP DOUBTLESS FOUND THEM APPEALING. MIYAZAWA HAS AMBITIONS FOR FURTHER CABINET POSTS AND POSSIBLY A PRIME MINISTERSHIP IN THE FUTURE. THE BACKING OF THE POWER BROKERS ON THE RIGHT WILL HELP HIM REALIZE THESE GOALS FAR MORE THAN HELP FROM LIBERALS LIKE MIKI. (HE IS ALSO REPORTEDLY VERY FRUSTRATED SERVING UNDER MIKI NOW.) AS THE LOCKHEED SCANDAL COMES TO A HEAD AND THE ELECTIONS NEAR, THE NEED FOR SUCH SUPPORT MAY BE IMMINENT. FURTHER, MIYAZAWA'S TILT AWAY FROM THE PRC MAY STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN THE ONGOING STRUGGLE WITHIN THE OHIRA. PRESUMABLY, MANY IN THE FACTION FAVOR A MORE CAUTIOUS POSTURE TOWARD THE PRC. FINALLY, ANY POLITICIAN WITH LONG RANGE AMBITIONS NATURALLY WANTS TO PROTECT HIS FUTURE IMAGE. SHOULD PROBLEMS ARISE OVER US HANDLING OF TAIWAN QUESTION, MIYAZAWA'S WARN-
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INGS MAY MAKE HIM LOOK GOOD. CONVERSELY, A FAILURE TO SOUND PUBLIC ALARM MIGHT SUBJECT HIM TO SEVERE CRITICISM WITHIN THE LDP.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976TOKYO10983
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760280-0608
From: TOKYO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760734/aaaabebu.tel
Line Count: 209
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 MAY 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <02 SEP 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: REASONS BEHIND MIYAZAWA STATEMENTS ON CHINA POLICY SUMMARY: LAST WEEK FONMIN MIYAZAWA PUBLICLY WARNED US AGAINST SUD-
TAGS: PFOR, JA, CH, UR, US, (MIYAZAWA, KIICHI)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006